Chomsky, Noam
▶ Watch on YouTubeCoverage note: full (a short, roughly one-hour remote interview, explicitly framed by Lex as a departure from his usual longer in-person conversations, recorded not long after Lex's own trip to Ukraine)
Core ideas
Framing note: This episode is a focused political interview in which Chomsky lays out his own, long-standing and often contrarian interpretation of the Russia-Ukraine war and U.S. foreign policy — views he has advanced publicly for decades and that are contested by many other analysts. The summary below presents his arguments as his arguments (using "he argues," "he says," "in his view") rather than as settled fact, particularly regarding contested questions of blame, motive, and historical causation in an active war.
Asked what motivates Vladimir Putin, Chomsky says he has no special insight into Putin's mind and can only infer motive from actions and statements over roughly 25 years in power. He argues Putin's throughline has been restoring Russia's status as a great power after the economic and social devastation of 1990s "shock therapy," maintaining tight authoritarian control at home (while himself allegedly amassing personal wealth through what Chomsky calls a kleptocracy), and above all preventing Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership — a red line he says Putin held to for two decades before the 2022 invasion. Chomsky traces this history through what he describes as a broken U.S. promise to Gorbachev not to expand NATO eastward, the 2008 Bucharest summit's contested invitation to Ukraine and Georgia, the 2014 Maidan uprising and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, and what he characterizes as the Biden administration's 2021 moves toward deeper "de facto" NATO integration of Ukraine — all of which he presents as the context (not the justification) for the invasion. He explicitly rejects Western commentary portraying Putin as an irrational figure bent on reconquering a "greater Russian empire" or attacking NATO itself, arguing this account is logically incoherent with the same commentators' simultaneous claims that Russia's military is too weak to take cities near its own border.
Despite this contextual analysis, Chomsky is unambiguous that he considers the invasion itself a "supreme international crime" — explicitly placing it, in terms of illegality under international law, in the same category as the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Stalin-Hitler invasion of Poland — and states plainly that "any power that commits aggression is to blame." He argues Western policy discussion has narrowed to only one legitimate question (how to help Ukraine militarily defend itself) while suppressing a second, in his view equally urgent question: how to pursue a diplomatic settlement that ends the war before further escalation, starvation, and climate setbacks occur, and before the conflict climbs what he calls the "escalation ladder" toward possible nuclear war. He credits the Pentagon with vetoing proposals (like a no-fly zone requiring strikes inside Russia) that he says would risk direct NATO-Russia conflict, and warns that Western rhetoric assuming Russia can simply be fought to "total defeat" gambles on Putin — whom the same commentators call an irrational madman — quietly accepting loss rather than escalating with weapons he has not yet used.
On propaganda, Chomsky distinguishes it from outright lying: he argues mainstream Western media reporting is "rarely a matter of straight-out lying" and that journalists often do courageous, accurate work, but operate inside an unstated framing (e.g., an unquestioned assumption that a given war is "basically honorable" even when specific abuses are criticized) that constitutes a propaganda system of selection and omission rather than fabrication — a model he developed decades earlier in Manufacturing Consent. He cites Graham Fuller, a former senior U.S. intelligence official, describing contemporary Western media coverage of Russia as more one-sidedly hostile than anything seen even during the Cold War, and notes that Russian state outlets have been banned in the West, making it harder to hear the Russian government's own framing directly. His advice for cutting through propaganda is to actively seek out multiple independent sources and historical context rather than relying on any single outlet.
Turning to China, Chomsky states starkly that a U.S.-China war "would destroy the possibilities of organized life on Earth," and argues human civilization's survival depends on U.S.-China cooperation on shared existential problems (climate change, pandemics, nuclear risk) rather than confrontation. He criticizes current U.S. policy — explicitly named "encirclement" in his account, involving military buildups with allies like South Korea, Japan, and Australia and NATO's extension of interest into the "Indo-Pacific" — as dangerous, and (citing former Australian PM Kevin Rudd) frames the U.S.-stated "China threat" as fundamentally being that China does not follow U.S. dictates, unlike U.S. allies who comply even when they privately object (his example: European states adhering to U.S.-imposed Iran sanctions despite publicly opposing them). He argues the U.S. rhetorically supports a "rules-based international order" specifically because the U.S. sets the rules, in preference to the UN Charter's binding prohibition on the threat or use of force — a framework he says no postwar U.S. president has actually observed — and separately argues the U.S. lacks the moral standing to selectively protest China's internal human-rights record given its continued support for comparable conduct by allies, citing U.S. aid to Israel and to Egypt's government as examples of what he sees as double standards driving skepticism of U.S. positions across the Global South.
On America's internal condition, Chomsky argues the country's greatest threat is self-inflicted decline: he cites declining U.S. life expectancy and worsening health outcomes since the late 1970s/early '80s — a divergence he attributes to a "neoliberal assault" of the past four decades — alongside a Republican Party he describes as having become an obstructionist, power-focused faction rather than a normal political party, and a Supreme Court he characterizes (citing recent rulings, including Clarence Thomas's opinions on gun laws and other decisions) as pursuing a reactionary, backward-looking agenda. He closes by arguing that human civilization's future depends on the U.S. taking a leading role in addressing shared global crises rather than obstructing climate action, framing continued fossil-fuel maximization and anti-ESG state policies as effectively a message to the world that threatens everyone's future.
Excerpts
On what he believes motivates Putin, and his rejection of the "irrational madman" theory:
“There is a theory in the West that he suddenly became a total madman who wants to restore the great Russian empire... but somehow along with this he's planning to attack NATO powers, conquer Europe — who knows what — it's impossible to put all these concepts together, they're totally internally contradictory... What motivates him is what he's been demonstrating in his actions: restore Russia as a great power, restore its economy, control it as a total dictatorship, enrich himself and his cronies, establish a legacy... make sure that Ukraine does not join NATO.”
On assigning blame for the invasion while also urging a second, in his view neglected question:
“Any power that commits aggression is to blame — so I continue to say... the invasion, Putin's invasion of Ukraine, is on a par with such acts of aggression as the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Stalin-Hitler invasion of Poland... but if you're serious about Ukraine there are two things you ask: one, what can we do to support Ukraine in defense against aggression; second, how can we move to end the war before it leads to even worse destruction.”
On why he believes the Global South has not joined Western opposition to Russia:
“They say yes, we oppose the invasion of Ukraine, terrible crime, but what are you talking about — this is what you do to us all the time, you don't care about crimes like this... We can't comprehend that because we're so insulated that we are just obviously right and everyone who doesn't go along must be wrong.”